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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 19-1679
____________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
v.
LARON HOLLAMAN,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2-17-cr-00189-001)
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon
____________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
April 21, 2020
Before: HARDIMAN, RENDELL, and FISHER, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: April 30, 2020)
____________
OPINION*
____________

*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7
does not constitute binding precedent.

HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Laron Hollaman appeals an order of the District Court denying his motion to
suppress evidence following his conditional guilty plea to unlawful possession of a
firearm by a felon in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). We will affirm.
I
The District Court held a hearing on the motion to suppress. Officer Richard
Kadlecik, a ten-year veteran of the Robinson Township Police Department, testified for
the Government, and Hollaman testified on his own behalf. Their testimony conflicted in
material ways, so the case turns on the District Court’s finding that Kadlecik was more
credible than Hollaman.
Officer Kadlecik testified he was driving his marked police car in an area known
for narcotics activity and prostitution when he observed a young white man pacing in the
parking lot of the Hilltop Inn. Wondering whether the man was either waiting for a drug
deal or a ride, Kadlecik doubled back and saw a car with heavily tinted windows pull into
the Hilltop Inn parking lot. The man stopped pacing and walked directly to the passenger
side of the vehicle, got into the front seat, and exited “no more than” thirty seconds later.
App. 75. The vehicle left the parking lot immediately and the man walked away.
Suspecting he had just witnessed a drug deal, Officer Kadlecik ran the vehicle’s
license plate and followed it to a nearby gas station. The car parked at a gas pump, and
Kadlecik parked parallel to it. As he exited his cruiser, Kadlecik approached the driver
(Appellant Hollaman) and asked where he had been before he arrived at the gas station.
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Hollaman said he was meeting a cousin at a nearby hotel, and Kadlecik asked to see
Hollaman’s driver’s license.
After reviewing the license, Kadlecik reported what he observed in the parking lot,
which prompted Hollaman to admit he had lied about his cousin. Hollaman also admitted
to selling marijuana to the man in the hotel parking lot and that he still had a small bag of
cocaine in his car. Hollaman retrieved the cocaine from the car’s center console and gave
it to Kadlecik.
Hollaman then became anxious, which caused Officer Kadlecik to believe there
may be more contraband in the car. They moved to the rear of the vehicle and Hollaman
told Kadlecik he had just finished “doing some time” in state prison for a gun charge.
App. 84. Kadlecik continued questioning Hollaman, who admitted there were two loaded
firearms under the front passenger seat of the car. Kadlecik then handcuffed Hollaman
and called for backup. Once backup arrived, Kadlecik walked directly to the passenger
side of Hollaman’s vehicle and located the firearms.
Hollaman disputed several aspects of Officer Kadlecik’s testimony. He testified
that he dropped off his relative at the hotel before driving to the gas station. Hollaman
also denied letting a man into his car at the hotel or selling marijuana to anyone. And he
denied ever telling Kadlecik that he did so. According to Hollaman, Kadlecik refused to
return Hollaman’s driver’s license during the stop and repeatedly asked whether he sold
drugs to the man in the parking lot. Hollaman also testified Kadlecik ran his license plate
during the stop.

3

Perhaps most significantly, Hollaman denied telling Officer Kadlecik he possessed
cocaine and firearms. And he said he went into the center console to retrieve his vehicle’s
registration, not a bag of cocaine. To support his testimony, Hollaman introduced a
surveillance video from the gas station. Although this video recorded the entire stop,
there is no audio of the interaction. Even so, Hollaman used the video throughout his
testimony because it contradicts some of Kadlecik’s testimony about the stop. For
example, the video shows that Hollaman approached Kadlecik before he exited his patrol
car. It also suggests Kadlecik ran Hollaman’s license plate during the stop.
After considering the testimonial and video evidence, the District Court credited
most of Officer Kadlecik’s testimony and denied the motion to suppress.
II1
Hollaman first argues that even if Officer Kadlecik testified truthfully regarding
the activity at the Hilltop Inn, he lacked reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory
stop at the gas station. We disagree.
Based on his decade of experience, Officer Kadlecik thought the young white man
pacing in the Hilltop Inn parking lot was waiting on either a ride or a drug deal. Because
the man spent only thirty seconds in the car with the tinted windows, Kadlecik naturally
eliminated the innocuous option (waiting for a ride) in favor of the nefarious option (a

1

The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We review the District Court’s denial of a motion to suppress
for clear error as to the underlying factual determinations but exercise plenary review
over the District Court’s application of law to those facts.” United States v. Stabile, 633
F.3d 219, 230 (3d Cir. 2011).
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drug deal). Officer Kadlecik’s determination, when considered in light of his experience
and common sense, is entitled to “considerable deference.” See United States v. Brown,
765 F.3d 278, 290 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting United States v. Mosley, 454 F.3d 249, 252 (3d
Cir. 2006)). So the District Court did not err when it concluded that the events at the
Hilltop Inn established the “minimal level of objective justification” needed to support
reasonable suspicion. United States v. Graves, 877 F.3d 494, 498 (3d Cir. 2017) (citation
omitted).
III
Having concluded that Officer Kadlecik had reasonable suspicion to investigate
Hollaman at the gas station, we turn to the question whether Kadlecik obtained probable
cause to search Hollaman’s vehicle. Hollaman argues the District Court clearly erred
when it credited Officer Kadlecik’s testimony in support of its probable cause
determination. Again, we disagree.
As the District Court noted, there are some “modest discrepancies” between
Officer Kadlecik’s testimony and the surveillance video Hollaman presented at the
hearing. App. 1. But these discrepancies do not “plainly contradict[]” Kadlecik’s
testimony. See United States v. Davis, 726 F.3d 434, 440 (3d Cir. 2013). For example, the
basis of Kadlecik’s probable cause determination was Hollaman’s incriminating
statements about selling marijuana, possessing cocaine, and having two loaded firearms
in his car. The video does not contradict Kadlecik’s testimony regarding those statements.
In fact, the video supports his version of events insofar as it shows him looking for the
two firearms under the front passenger seat immediately after talking to Hollaman. This
5

targeted search is consistent with Officer Kadlecik’s incident report, in which he said that
Hollaman told him exactly where the guns were located.
Because Hollaman failed to produce evidence which leaves us with the “definite
and firm conviction” that the District Court erred in crediting Officer Kadlecik’s
testimony, see United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 570 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal citation
and quotation marks omitted), we will affirm the District Court’s order denying the
motion to suppress.2
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Hollaman’s additional argument that Kadlecik lacked probable cause to seize
him and search his vehicle fails because it is based on the invalid premise that the District
Court clearly erred when it found that Hollaman incriminated himself.
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